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Abstract: Badāʾ is one of the exclusive doctrines of the Shiʾte theology which 
has been commonly rejected by the Sunni thought in the Islamic world. 
According to a rough explication, this doctrine says that God’s will is not 
restricted by His eternal destiny, but He is free to intervene deliberately in 
some current affairs of the universe and direct it towards an end different 
from what was predestined by Himself. Shi’te thinkers commonly appeal to 
some textual evidences (including Quranic verses as well as some sayings of 
their imams) to present a satisfying religious ground for badāʾ. They have 
proposed both figurative (metaphorical) and non-figurative (literal) 
interpretations of these textual evidences. According to the latter, some 
theological problems concerning the principle of the Divine immutability 
arise. In this paper, I deal with one of these problems which claims that badāʾ 
entails God’s mutability via requiring a change in His eternal knowledge (i.e. 
changing His mind). After reformulating this problem as a simple argument 
against the rational plausibility of badāʾ, I explain and briefly examine three 
solutions for the problem which respectively consist in making an analogy 
between badāʾ and naskh, attributing the assumed change to the realm of the 
celestial souls’ knowledge and accommodating the change in God’s relational 
(not essential) knowledge.     
Keywords: Doctrine of Badāʾ, Shi’te Theology, God’s Knowledge, God’s 
Immutability. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
One of the exclusive doctrines of the Shiʾte School in the Islamic tradition is the 
doctrine of badāʾ. Shiʾte scholars have been inspired by some Quranic verses as well 
as some traditions1 (ḥadiṯ=narrated saying of the prophet and the infallible imams). 
Although this could be mainly thought of as a theological issue concerning Divine 
attributes like knowledge and will, it is usually linked to other significant theological 
                                                          
1 Although I believe that the translation of the Arabic words “ḥadiṯ” (ثیدح) and “riwāyah” (ۀیاور) into 
the English word “tradition” is not so appropriate, I use it here regarding its more or less widespread 
usage in the literature. At any rate, according to Shi’te scholars “ḥadiṯ” (tradition or narration), in its 
broad sense, denotes words, actions and even silent approvals of the prophet and the imams, narrated 
by people and collected in some ḥadiṯ collections.    
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or philosophical issues such as the human freewill, the effectiveness of the 
petitionary prayer and the truthfulness of the predictions and prophecies of the 
Divine infallible prophets.2  
As we shall see, there have been diverse interpretations of this doctrine among 
Shiʾte thinkers. In a rough explication, the doctrine of badāʾ says that Divine will is 
never restricted by an eternal destiny but is always free. Thus, in some cases, it 
appears to Him to intervene deliberately in some current affairs of the universe and 
direct it towards an end different from what was predestined by Himself.3 At the first 
glance, the doctrine seems to be sufficiently plausible and consistent with the so-
called “perfect being theology” since the most conceivable perfect being must be 
beyond any limitation including those assumedly imposed by his own nature. More 
contemplation on the implications of the doctrine, however, may indicate that this 
characterisation can raise some theological problems. For instance, it may be said that 
the acceptance of badāʾ apparently requires us to admit that God’s will, as well as 
God’s eternal knowledge, can change and this seems quite problematic since 
according to the prominent Shiʾte concept of God, He is totally simple and His 
essential attributes are identical with His very essence. Therefore, God’s knowledge 
and will, as His essential attributes, are not properties distinct from His very essence 
but identical with it. Consequently, any change in these attributes entails a change in 
His essence, which is absurd since God is necessarily immutable. Therefore, at least 
in the first glance, the doctrine of badāʾ ends in the possibility of God’s being mutable 
which is theologically implausible.  
Moreover, one may think that this doctrine implies God’s prior ignorance of some 
future facts since it seems that the reason for a change taking place in God’s will is 
nothing but His becoming aware of some new facts He has not known earlier. And 
this is a serious threat to the belief in God’s omniscience. In other words, it may seem 
that badāʾ happens due to God’s changing His mind, which is, in a theology which 
pictures God as the most conceivable perfect being, unreasonable.  
These initial (mis)understandings and prejudices naturally have encouraged the 
non-Shiʾte (Sunni) theologians to reject firmly the plausibility of the doctrine of badāʾ 
and even to condemn it as heretical. Thus, over the last centuries, there has been a 
                                                          
2 Sad to say that in many works about badāʾ, some other relevant but partially different issues are 
mixed and put together without making any clear analysis. For example, a relevant issue is that in 
some historical reports a prophet who is considered as an infallible man makes a prediction which 
will appear to be wrong and at least some of these wrong predictions are about the cases of badāʾ. So, 
it seems strange that some texts which are expected to explain the plausibility of badāʾ, suddenly 
engage in the second issue and try to explain why these predictions fail.  
3 Since the doctrine of badāʾ has different aspects, it is capable of being interpreted initially in 
several ways corresponding to that specific aspect which is going to be highlighted. Goldziher, for 
example, defines badāʾ as a theological term as “the emergence of new circumstances which cause a 
change in an earlier divine ruling.” See Goldziher (1986, 850). As we see, this definition emphasizes 
somehow on the relation between the doctrine and the Divine will and ruling. Another point in this 
characterization is that it takes the real change of the divine rule for granted and makes no room for 
an apparent but not real change.    
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historical debate over this issue among the Islamic sects. Faẖr al-Din al-Razi, the great 
Ashaʾrite theologian, for example, confirms the expression of Suleimān bin Jarir who 
says in an ironic tone that the imams of the Shiʾa innovated the theory of badāʾ so that 
by appealing to it they never could be defeated by their opponents. The imams 
promised that they will soon become rulers and when this did not actually happen 
they excused this as a case of badāʾ that had taken place for God (and He had 
changed his will).4 
In reaction to such refutations and accusations, Shiʾte thinkers, both theologians 
and philosophers, have usually tried to show that the opponents’ refutation is 
essentially based on a deep misunderstanding and that the idea of badāʾ never means 
that God changes his mind in the sense that he comes to realise a new fact or to 
repent His initial decision and thus changes it to a new one. So, their duty has been, 
first, to show how and why this misunderstanding arises and, second, to establish 
rationally that the true content of this doctrine never contradicts any other 
theological principle about God and His attributes.5 
In this paper, I am going to focus just on one aspect of the problem, i.e. the relation 
between the Doctrine of badāʾ and the Divine knowledge6; whether badāʾ requires a 
change in God’s knowledge and whether this could really end in a theological 
problem.7 But before this, it is useful to have a short look at the textual resources of 
the doctrine as an Islamic dogma.     
 
2. Badāʾ in the Quran and the Traditions (narrations) 
 
Badāʾ (ءادب)  is an Arabic infinitive literally means “appearance” or “emergence.” When 
it is used in the form of a verb with the preposition “to” (  ل) , it commonly means that 
a new opinion appears or emerges to the subject so that he/she changes his/her 
previous opinion. In other words, it means “changing one’s mind.”  
Some derivatives of the infinitive “badāʾ” are used in the Quran nine times8 in the 
form of a past tense verb but no one is directly relevant to the theological 
terminology. In other words, what is referred to by these verses as something which 
appears does not appear to God. For example:  
                                                          
4 Al-Ṯusi (1405, 421) . For some views of the Muʿtazilite theologians See: ʿAbd al-Jabbār (1962, 65) 
and al-Khayyat (1344, 128). 
5 Sheikh Muḥammad Rāzi popularly known as Aġa Bozorg Tehrani (1876-1970), one of the well-
known Shi’ite scholars in the field of the bibliographical research introduces in his great work Al-
Ḏary'a ila Taṣanyf al-Shia about 25 books and treatises written by the Shi’ite scholars on the topic of 
badāʾ. See Rāzi (1983:53-57). For a contemporary bibliography see: Zādhoosh (1382).   
6 Al-Shahrastāni distinguished between three kinds of badāʾ; badāʾ in God’s knowledge, in His will 
and in His command. Al-Shahrastāni (1923, 110). 
7 Many scholars who wrote on badāʾ adopted a historical approach instead of a theological or 
philosophical one. For some of these works see: Hekyemez (2008) and Howard (1990).   
8 Quran: 45: 33, 6: 28, 39: 47, 39: 48, 12: 35, 60: 4, 3: 118, 7: 22 and 20: 121. McDermott distinguishes 
between two meanings of the word “badāʾ” in the Quran; “to become manifest” and “to seem good” 
and indicates just seven verses. McDermott (1978, 329-330) 
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“If the evildoers possessed all that is in the earth, and the like of it with it, they would 
offer it to ransom themselves from the evil of the chastisement on the Day of 
Resurrection; yet there would appear to them from God that they never reckoned 
with, and there would appear to them evils of that they have earned, and they would 
be encompassed by that they mocked at” (39/47-48). 
 
As we see, these two verses state that in the hereafter some facts appear to a group of 
people as evildoers and not to God.9 Thus, such verses cannot be considered as a 
Quranic source for the idea of badāʾ. Nevertheless, there are other verses that, though 
void of the word “badāʾ” or its derivatives, have a connotation close to the idea of 
badāʾ. One famous verse, for example, says: 
 
“Allah blots out what he wills and establishes (it) and with Him is the Origin of the 
Book (Umm al-Kitāb)” (13: 39). 
 
According to many Shiʾte scholars, including Quran interpreters (mufassirun) and 
theologians (mutikallimun), this verse expresses the heart of the doctrine of Divine 
badāʾ. The first part of the verse apparently says that in some cases God eliminates 
(changes) what He (initially) wills but in other cases He confirms what he had first 
decided. But the approval of the possibility of a kind of change in the Divine will is 
the same as what the doctrine of badāʾ claims. Nevertheless, the second part of the 
verse indicating the “Origin of the Book” refers to a level or scope of the Divine 
knowledge in which any change (blotting out) is impossible. 
Moreover, there are some verses reporting a historical story which can be 
interpreted as referring to an actual case of Divine badāʾ. For example, we may look 
at the story of Moses’ appointment with God on Mount Sinai to receive the Tawrah 
through the Divine revelation. This story is narrated in two different verses. In one 
place, we read: 
 
“And when We appointed with Moses forty nights then you took to yourselves the 
Calf after him and you were evildoers” (2: 51). 
 
In this verse, the time of the appointment is clearly mentioned as forty days.  In 
another verse, however, God says: 
 
“And We appointed with Moses thirty nights and We completed them with ten, so 
the appointed time of his Lord was forty nights…” (7: 142). 
 
This verse may refer to the fact that the total time of this appointment (i.e. forty days) 
was set in two stages so that the first time was just thirty days and after it, due to the 
occurrence of a Divine badāʾ, it was extended to forty days. 
                                                          
9 The difference between “appearance for” and “appearance from” should not be ignored.   
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There are other historical stories reported by Quran which could be interpreted as 
involving a case of badāʾ. The change of Muslims’ qibla from Jerusalem to Ka'ba10 (2: 
144), the change of God’s command to Abraham (in his dream) to slay his son Isma'il 
to a new order to slay a sheep instead of his son (37: 102-107)11 and the removal of the 
predestined worldly chastisement of the people of the prophet Jonah (10: 98)12 are 
some examples.  
In addition to the Quranic verses, there are some traditions about badāʾ narrated 
specially in Shiʾte sources. Some of these disclose the essential status of the belief in 
badāʾ among Islamic foundational beliefs. For example, it is narrated that: “Allah 
never is worshiped by something as he is been worshiped by [the belief in] badāʾ”13 or 
“No prophet became a prophet but he admitted five things: badāʾ, [Divine] will, 
prostration, worship and obedience.”14 
Some other traditions express the content of the doctrine and elucidate its 
theological foundations. For example, it is narrated from Imam Rizā, the eighth imam 
of the Shiʾte, that he said to Suleimān al-Mirwazi: “Oh Suleiman, there are some 
affairs which are non-determind (mawqufah) in the presence of God and He brings 
forward anyone He wills and postpones anyone He wills.”15   
Some traditions explain that the doctrine of badāʾ is consistent with other 
theological tenets such as God’s omniscience. It is narrated from Imam Sādiq, the 
sixth imam, that he said: “Nothing appeared to God (badā li-Allah) but it had been in 
His knowledge before it appeared to Him.”16  
 
3. Some Historical motivations 
 
Beside the Quranic verses and Islamic traditions whish have inspired Shi’te scholars, 
there have been some historical motivations behind the Shia endeavour to promote 
                                                          
10 “We have seen thee turning thy face about in the heaven; now We will surely turn thee to a 
direction that shall satisfy thee. Turn thy face towards the Holy Mosque; and wherever you are, turn 
your faces towards it…” (2: 144). 
11 “… he [Abraham] said, my son, I see in a dream that I shall sacrifice thee; consider, what thinkest 
thou? He said. My father, do as thou art bidden; thou shalt find me, God willing, one of the 
steadfast…. And We ransomed him with a mighty sacrifice” (37: 102-107). 
12 “Why was there never a city that believed, and its belief profited it? Except the people of Jonah; 
when they believed. We removed from them the chastisement of degradation in this present life, and 
We gave unto them enjoyment for a time.” (10: 98) 
13 Al-Kuleyni (1407, 200). 
14 Al-Kuleyni (1407, 204). The Shi’ite scholars have offered different interpretations of these 
traditions. For example, interpreting the first ḥadith, Mulla Sadra says that probably it means that 
when one can in the best way worship practically God regarding the cases of badāʾ since in the cases 
one is ignorant of the Divine specific rationale behind the involved change of the Divine will and 
order but nevertheless he truly believe in the Divine wisdom and that this change is really prudent. 
See: Mullā Sadrā (1370, 196). Muḥammad Kāzim Aṣṣār in his treatise on badāʾ gives alternative 
interpretation. See: Aṣṣār (1376, 97-100) 
15 Al-Majlisi (1305, 96) 
16 Al-Kuleyni (1407, 203) 
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the idea of badāʾ. A historical point which can help us to gain a better understanding 
of the doctrine is that according to the Quran the Jews believe that God in the 
eternity decides and fixed all the future events and now He himself is not able to do 
anything different from the eternal predestined plan; God is powerless to change the 
determined scenario of the universe. The Quran strongly rejects this belief: “The Jews 
have said: ‘God’s hand is fettered.’ Fettered are their hands, and they are cursed for what they 
have said. Nay, but His hands are outspread; He expends how He will…” (5, 64). Thus, one 
of the historical motivation for promoting the doctrine of badāʾ was that it is a 
rational response to the heretical Jewish idea which says that God’s will is totally 
restricted by His own eternal predetermination.17 
The second motivation was to resist against Islamic fatalism; the view endorsed 
specially by the so-called Jabriyyah and most Asha‘rites who believe that one’s actions 
are absolutely guided and fixed by the divine fate so that one can never change it. 
One of the aspects of the doctrine of badāʾ, however, is that human beings, through 
performing free deeds, whether good (like praying, paying for charity etc.) or bad 
(like killing innocent people) can change their initial destiny.18 
 
4. Linguistic Analysis; figurative vs. non-figurative interpretations  
 
According to the Arabic language structure, the standard expression of the Divine 
badāʾ is to say:  
 
(Standard Expression): “It appears to God in x that y.” 
 
Where x and y are variables that range over events so that in any particular instance 
of badāʾ, the event E1 whose occurrence in the future was initially predicted 
substitutes with another event E2, i.e. E1 does not occur actually and E2 occurs 
instead of it. For example, if we see the story of Abraham’s son as a case of badāʾ, we 
may report it as follows: “It appeared to God in the slaying of Abraham’s son that a 
sheep will be slayed instead of him.”   
Many of those who reject the theological doctrine of badāʾ normally interpret it in 
this way.  First, God has a specific item of knowledge according to which He intends 
to perform a specific action. Before performing that action, however, His knowledge 
changes and, consequently, He decides to do another action. It seems that most 
opponents of the doctrine of badāʾ, if not all, reject it on the basis of such an 
interpretation. Their objection could be that the doctrine is unacceptable since it 
contradicts God’s immutability.  
One rather ready to hand reaction to this line of objection is to provide a linguistic 
analysis of the semantics of the standard expression. Here, many Shiʾte thinkers 
                                                          
17 Tracing this idea back to the Jewish sources needs further research.  
18 This is that aspect of the doctrine that is closely linked to the problem of the effectiveness of our 
prayers. 
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claim that, regarding the rational and plausible view about the Divine attributes such 
as His immutability, the application of the Arabic term “badāʾ” to God must be 
interpreted in a somehow metaphoric way. There are several suggestions. One is that 
“badāʾ”, when used for God, is used as a transitive infinitive which means “to 
manifest or to disclose (something hidden)”.  According to this, when we say that 
“badāʾ occurred for God in E1 that E2”, it does not mean anything more than God, 
through making E2 actual, manifested it and made it appear to us by bringing it 
about while according to our prior knowledge, we had expected the occurrence of 
E1. In other words, the apparently intransitive verb “appear” is used in a transitive 
sense, i.e., making (something) manifest. Thus, according to this interpretation, in a 
case of badāʾ, what actually happens is just that God manifests the occurrence of a 
new event for us and this evidently does not seem theologically problematic at all.19   
A second similar interpretation is that when one says that badāʾ takes place for 
God, one really means that it takes place for some of His creatures (human beings, for 
instance) not for Him. So, what we really do is to attribute badāʾ to God in a 
figurative way. It means nothing but that we come to know something new and the 
occurrence of a new event appears to us.  
Still a third view claims that when we say that “something appears to God” (لله ادب)  
what we mean by “to” (  ل)  is nothing but “from” (ن  م)  and subsequently this sentence 
means that something is disclosed from God (for others not for Him).20  
It seems obvious enough that according to such abovementioned interpretations, 
speaking of Divine badāʾ, by no means implies any change in God’s knowledge or 
will. Many Shiʾte scholars think that such a conceptual and linguistic analysis of the 
doctrine of the Divine badāʾ plausibly shows that the refusal of this doctrine by the 
opponents is due to a real misunderstanding. 
Beside the figurative interpretations, however, there are non-figurative (literal( 
interpretations according to which in the case of badāʾ, really something new appears 
to God. One rationale behind this second group of interpretations seems to be that 
according to the figurative interpretations the doctrine loses its expected theological 
content; it does not convey anything more than the somehow trivially known fact 
that we human beings are not omniscient subjects, that our knowledge about future 
events is quite limited and that in many cases what actually will occur in the future is 
different from what we predicted in the past. And this is a totally indubitable fact 
about human knowledge and beyond any significant controversy. Thus, we may say 
that the figurative interpretation tries to present a view consistent with the “perfect 
being theism” of Shiʾte theologians at the cost of making the doctrine void of any 
theologically significant content.  
To be sure, however, the adherents of the literal interpretation face some serious 
theological problems and, thus, have the responsibility to offer a rational picture of 
Divine badāʾ which is consistent with other tenets of their theology. According to this 
                                                          
19 Aṣṣār (1376, 69). For a critique of this interpretation, see: Aṣṣār (1376, 70). 
20 Ibn Bābūye (1387, 24-25) 
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interpretation, badāʾ apparently implies a kind of change in God’s attributes and if 
(according to the principle of the Divine simplicity) His attributes are to be identical 
to His very essence, then the occurrence of badāʾ will end in a change in His essence 
and this obviously contradicts the reasonable principle of the Divine immutability. 
There could be several versions of the theological problem regarding the diversity of 
the Divine attributes, including God’s knowledge, will and impassibility. In the rest 
of this paper, I shall focus on one version of the problem which concerns the relation 
between badāʾ and God’s knowledge. The main question is whether badāʾ implies a 
change in God’s knowledge (“changing His mind”) and if so, whether this change 
leads to any theologically implausible results.  
 
5. The Knowledge Argument (KA) 
 
The present problem can be formulated as an argument against the doctrine of badāʾ:  
 
(1) Divine badāʾ implies a change of God’s knowledge. 
(2) A change of God’s knowledge implies a change of His essence. 
(3) God’s essence is immutable; it is impossible for Him to change. (The principle 
of God’s immutability) 
Conclusion: Divine badāʾ is impossible. 
 
Let’s call this argument the “knowledge argument” (KA). Considering the above 
formulation of (KA), there could be several ways to tackle it. The third premise, 
however, is so widely accepted by Muslim theologians and philosophers that seems 
to be beyond any controversy. Thus, to response to (KA) one can deny either the first 
premise or the second.    
 
6. The rejection of the First Premise    
 
In order to criticize (KA), one strategy could be to reject the first premise. Those 
Shiʾte thinkers who make a similarity between badāʾ and naskh (abrogation) can be 
considered as those who use this strategy21. The idea is that both badāʾ and naskh 
                                                          
21 ‘Naskh’ )خسن( is an Arabic word literally means “abrogation.” Its technical usage as a term of the 
science of Quran exegesis (tafsir) and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is inspired by a verse which says: 
“None of Our revelations do we abrogate or cancel to be forgotten, but We substitute something better or 
similar. Knowest thou not that Allah hath power over all things” (2: 106). According to a rough and general 
explication, when applied to the Quranic verses, naskh is a relation between two verses so that the 
recitation or/and the content of the first verse is substituted by the second. According to another 
definition, proposed in the field of Islamic jurisprudence, naskh is the abrogation of one Islamic law by 
another one. There are several explanations of the phenomenon of naskh. Most Shi’ite scholars believe 
that naskh never means that God changes the religious rule He Himself has legislated. Instead, when a 
religious law is abrogated, we come to discover that it was not essentially an eternal law but 
temporally limited and now it’s time is over. In other words, after the legislation of the first religious 
law, since there is no indication of the time limitation, people think that this law is for ever. After the 
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follow the same logic in the sense that in both cases we discover that the time of the 
initial Divine decree finished and the time of a new one begins.  The only difference 
is that naskh happens in the realm of God’s legal (tashri’i) decrees while badāʾ occurs 
in His creational (takwini) decrees concerning the affairs of His creation.  
This view has been endorsed by a group of Shi’te theologians including Ibn 
Babūye al-Sadūq and his pupil al-Mufid22 as well as some philosophers like 
Mirdāmād who makes a comparison between badāʾ and naskh and concludes that 
there is just one difference between them, namely that naskh relates to the Islamic 
legal laws while badāʾ takes place in relation to the external events. Mirdāmād writes: 
“[T]he status of badāʾ in the creation (takwin) is [like] the status of naskh in [Divine] 
legislation (tashri’)”.23  
It is obvious that according to this view the occurrence of badāʾ does not imply any 
change in God’s knowledge. In the case of the story of Abraham, for example, this 
view leads to the analysis that God knew from the first that His command of slaying 
Abraham’s son, Isma’il, is a temporary one and that the new command after it would 
be to slay a sheep instead of the son. To put it in other words, God from the eternity 
knew that He will give two commands so that the first is a temporary one and after 
the ending of its specific time, the second command will be subsequently issued and 
become active. Thus, this view, at least in the first glance, can tackle (KA) through 
rejecting its first premise.  
The abovementioned view has been criticized by other Shiʾte scholars. For 
example, Mulla Sadra (1572-1640), the most prominent pupil of Mirdamad, discards 
the view of his master. One of his objections is that in some cases, like the story of 
Abraham, the context of the badāʾ seems to be legislative, since the relevant badāʾ 
assumedly occurred in God’s command which can be seen as a particular law 
addressed to Abraham, not a factual event in the external world.   
The second and more important objection is that there seems to be a more essential 
difference between badāʾ and naskh when both relate to human actions. In naskh, the 
action which loses its initial religious property is not a particular one but a universal 
which can be instantiated in several cases and in different times and places by 
different people. In the case of badāʾ, however, there is just one single action which 
undertakes a kind of change in its property.24   
In order to clarify this difference, we may compare an alleged case of naskh with 
one of badāʾ. Inspired by a couple of Quranic verses, some Muslim scholars believe 
that, at the early years after the rise of Islam, drinking wine was religiously 
legitimate for Muslims, but after a while, this initial law became abrogated and God 
prohibited drinking wine by revealing new verses. Here, drinking wine is a universal 
notion referring to a type which can have multiple instances. So, those instances 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
legislation of the new law (which is not consistent with the first) the people come to realise that the 
time of the first law has ended and henceforth, the new one will be legally valid. 
22 Ibn Bābūye (1387, 335) and Al-Mufid (1403: 53). 
23 Mirdāmād (1374, 55). 
24 Mullā Sadrā (1370, 184) 
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realised by Muslims before the naskh were religiously permissible and those 
performed after it were (and still are) prohibited. But consider Abraham’s story as a 
case of badāʾ. In this story the same particular action, namely the sacrifice of his son, 
was first the subject of God’s command and later the subject of His waiver.   
 
7. The rejection of the Second Premise 
 
The second strategy is to reject the second premise of (KA). Mullā Sadrā’s own 
response to the challenge can be seen as an example of this strategy.   His position is 
based on some cosmological principles. First, as it is established in his metaphysics, 
the whole universe, consists of several co-existent worlds (‘awālim) which are ranging 
from the world of the absolutely immaterial intellects to the world of pure physical 
objects in a hierarchical order. One of the intermediate worlds is that of the celestial 
souls who are governing and arranging all the affairs of the lower world of physical 
creatures. According to Sadra, these souls are identical to the so-called “angels” in 
the scriptures. These souls are so obedient to God that they never have a false belief 
or perform a wrong action25. Thus, all their knowledge and deeds correspond God’s 
knowledge and will in a way that one can truly (and in a non-figurative way) 
attribute their knowledge and will to God.26 Moreover, as far as they are responsible 
for the ever-changing physical affairs of the lower material world, their knowledge is 
subject to change. 
Now, Sadra’s response can be stated briefly as follows: Because of containing a 
variety of potentialities, the world of nature is subject to a continuous and essential 
change.  God’s and the celestial souls’ knowledge of the universe are of the kind of 
“active knowledge.”27 The occurrence of badāʾ is due to a kind of change in the 
knowledge of the heavenly souls, which in its turn follows the wise and rational ends 
regarding what is the best destiny for the creatures. Since these souls are not God, 
but His creatures, their being subject to change is something possible. Thus, the 
change relevant to badāʾ just takes place in their knowledge instead of God’s 
                                                          
25 According to a well-known interpretation of some Quranic verses, angles are infallible in 
knowledge and action: “Believers, guard yourselves and your families against a Fire whose fuel is 
men and stones, and over which are harsh, terrible angels who disobey not God in what He 
commands them and do what they are commanded.” (66: 6) Though this verse is about a specific 
group of angels, the feature of infallibility is generalised to cover all types of angels. Mulla Sadra, 
among others, takes this verse as a Quranic evidence for his claim. Mullā Sadrā (1981, 396)  
26 Sadra draws an analogy between the relation of God with these souls and the relation of the 
Human soul (mind) with sensual faculties. These faculties are so obedient to the human soul that all 
their activities can be rationally considered as the activities of the soul itself. Mullā Sadrā (1981, 396) 
27 For Muslim philosophers, “active knowledge” is that kind of knowledge which lies somewhere 
in the causal chain of its object. It is worth noting that knowledge here is used as a translation for the 
Arabic word (‘ilm) which is applied by the Muslim philosophers and theologians both to God and the 
human beings and has a broader definition than that of “knowledge” in contemporary epistemology. 
One very simple example of the human active knowledge is the case of an architect’s mental plan of a 
building he is going to construct it in the external world.    
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knowledge. Nevertheless, since (as mentioned earlier) their knowledge can be, in a 
non-metaphorical sense, attributed to God, one can literally say that badāʾ occurs to 
God (badā li al-Allah). Nevertheless, there is no change in the eternal essential 
knowledge of God and thus it does not require any change in God’s essence.28 
As one may see, Sadra’s response to (KA) admits a kind of change in the Divine 
knowledge (based on the souls’ knowledge change) and at the same time, does not 
entail God’s being mutable. 
In order to assess this response, on may consider its metaphysical principles and 
specially the existence of the so-called celestial souls as controversial and disputed by 
the majority of the contemporary metaphysicians. Moreover, it remains somehow 
obscure that how can this view succeed in attributing both change and permanence 
to the Divine knowledge in a non-figurative and non-contradictive way.  
 
8. God’s Relational Knowledge 
 
There is another way to reject the second premise of (KA). It is based on the Muslim 
philosophers’ distinction between two kinds of the Divine attributes: absolute vs. 
relational attributes. An absolute attribute, as a concept, is what our minds grasp 
from the Divine essence itself and expresses one aspect of His absolute perfection. 
Divine power and life are usually seen as absolute attributes. On the other hand, 
relational attributes are those which, as concepts, come to our mind due to our 
contemplation on one or another relation between God and other beings, so that we 
could not have this concept if there was not such a relation in reality. “Being the 
creator of something” is an example for the relational attributes. If we do not 
consider the specific relation between God (as the producer) and another being (as 
the product) we will not be able to grasp and use the concept of “creator” as a Divine 
attribute. 
Having this distinction in mind, we should note that for Muslim philosophers, 
some of the Divine attributes can be seen both as an absolute attribute and a 
relational one. Knowledge is a good example. It is widely accepted by Muslim 
philosophers that we can use “knowledge” as an attribute indicating a kind of 
perfection in the very essence of God without any need to consider another being 
beside Him. In this perspective, knowledge is an absolute attribute of God. Still we 
can consider it as expressing a specific type of relation between God (as the knower) 
and something else (as what is known) and consequently see it as a relational 
attribute.  
Given the plausibility of the above analysis, it is usually thought that the principle 
of Divine simplicity, i.e. the identity between God’s essence and His attributes, is 
restricted to the first type of attributes, namely the absolute ones. And it is this kind 
of attribute that its assumed change leads to a change in God’s essence. On the other 
                                                          
28 See Mullā Sadrā (1981, 397-399).  
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side, the relational attributes are changeable since the changeability of things as the 
relata make a change in the relevant relations. Accordingly, though God’s relational 
attributes are subject to change, their mutability never affects the Divine 
immutability, since these are not identical with God’s essence. 
Now we can return to (KA). One may accept that badāʾ implies a kind of change in 
God’s knowledge. However, the claim could be that this change just occurs in God’s 
relational knowledge and not in His absolute knowledge. The reason for this claim is 
that badāʾ assumedly happens just in the field of objects and events of the world of 
nature and thus God’s knowledge of these, as an attribute of God, refers to a specific 
relation between God and other things and consequently the definition of the 
relational attribute does apply here. According to this analysis, the first premise of 
(KA) should be modified as follows: 
 
(1*) Divine badāʾ implies the change of God’s relational knowledge. 
 
It is obvious that in order to have a logically valid argument, the adherent of (KA) 
has to modify premise (2) and change it to: 
 
(2*) The change of God’s relational knowledge implies the change of His 
essence. 
 
Regarding the definition of the relational attributes, it is obvious that (2*) is false and 
therefore, the substitution of (2) with (2*) makes (KA) unsound. 
In sum, one may appeal to the following principles accepted by the Muslim 
philosophers to provide a reply to (KA) through showing that its proper formulation 
would offer an unsound argument: 
 
i. God has two kinds of attributes; absolute and relational. 
ii. Knowledge, as a Divine attribute, can be considered as both an absolute 
and a relational attribute. 
iii. God’s relational attributes are changeable but their change does not imply 
a change in the essence of God. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Shia doctrine of badāʾ, though initially plausible, may seem after a deeper 
concentration as inconsistent with some of the certain theological tenets concerning 
the Divine attributes such as God’s immutability. In response to this theological 
challenge, however, the Shiʾte scholars have tried to show the rationality of the 
doctrine and its consistency with other Islamic theological tenets. They have two 
main different strategies corresponding two types of interpretation of “badāʾ” 
attributed to God in the Islamic scriptures: figurative and non-figurative. The 
common feature of the different versions of this figurative or metaphorical 
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interpretation is that accordingly, in the actual cases of badāʾ, nothing really appears 
to God, but to others and from Him. It is obvious that these kinds of interpretations 
could solve the theological problem straightforwardly but at the cost of making the 
doctrine void of any theologically significant content.  
If one adopts the non-figurative interpretation, she will face the theological 
challenge directly and in a more serious way. Regarding different Divine attributes, 
such as His knowledge and will, this challenge could be stated as different 
arguments against the plausibility of badāʾ. According to one argument which was 
formulated and examined in this paper as the “knowledge argument” (KA), the 
occurrence of badāʾ requires a change of God’s essential knowledge which in its turn, 
contradicts God’s immutability. There are several ways to tackle (KA). One way 
which rejects the first premise of (KA) is to make an analogy between badāʾ and 
naskh. Some Muslim theologians and philosophers, like al-Mufid and Mirdāmād, 
have endorsed this view, but it was objected by others including Mirdāmād’s pupil 
Mullā Sadrā who highlighted the deep essential differences between badāʾ and naskh. 
Mullā Sadrā’s own solution could be analysed as one which rejects the second 
premise of (KA). This view based on some specific metaphysical principles, such as 
the existence of the so-called celestial souls, which could be very unlikely accepted 
by modern metaphysicians. Finally one may reject the second premise by appealing 
to the dichotomy of absolute/relational attributes and argue that badāʾ at most entails 
a change in God’s relational (not essential) knowledge and this does not disturb 
God’s immutability.  
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